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Abstract
The papers studies wage formation using panel data for a large
sample of Norwegian municipalities covering the time period 1970—
1992. The main conclusions are the following. Regional manufactur-
ing wages are negatively related to regional unemployment, but the
eﬀects of open as well as total regional unemployment are small. We
find a numerically important wage dampening eﬀect of labour market
programs. However, we can not reject the null that only total unem-
ployment matters. Finally, manufacturing profitability is important
in shaping regional manufacturing wages and reduced regional payroll
taxes are almost fully transmitted into reduced regional wage costs.
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1 Introduction
The main issue in the present paper will be to test whether or not Norwegian
regional wages are aﬀected by regional unemployment and labour market
programs (LMP). The empirical analysis is based on annual panel data for
322 municipalities for the time period 1970 to 1992.
The question of regional wage responsiveness to regional unemployment
is closely related to the analyses by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) who
estimate regional wage curves for a number of diﬀerent countries. Using data
for individuals, they provide evidence of a downward sloping wage curve. For
most countries the estimated unemployment elasticity of pay cluster around
—0.10. Further evidence of a downward sloping wage curve for Denmark is
given by Nicolaisen and Tranæs (1996), for Belgium by Janssens and Konings
(1998), for the Netherlands by Groot et al. (1992), for Germany by Baltagi
and Blien (1998) and Wagner (1994), for Austria by Winter-Ebmer (1996),
and for the US by Card (1995), Bratsberg and Turunen (1996) and Turunen
(1998).
Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) also report results for Norway supporting
a downward sloping regional wage curve, but the estimates are highly mixed
and depend upon the exact specification. Wulfsberg (1997) and Raaum and
Wulfsberg (1998) report rather low partial long-run elasticities of firm level
wages with respect to open county unemployment. The results in Dyrstad
and Johansen (2000), using panel data for Norwegian municipalities 1973—88,
imply a long-run regional unemployment elasticity of pay between —0.01 and
—0.02 while the elasticity with respect to aggregate unemployment approxi-
mates —0.07. Interestingly, the sum of the unemployment elasticities is close
to —0.1. One interpretation of this result is that Norwegian wages mainly
respond to labour market conditions through the central wage settlements
while the eﬀect working through local wage setting is more limited.
The present paper is partly an update of Dyrstad and Johansen (2000)
and utilise data for four new years characterised by relatively high and in-
creasing unemployment. A particular issue will be to investigate whether or
not the estimated unemployment eﬀect depends upon how regional labour
markets are defined. Since most Norwegian municipalities are very small,
one may argue that the state of the labour market outside the same munic-
ipality plays an important role. On the other hand, county may represent
a too wide definition of the relevant regional labour market, in particular
if the within-county unemployment dispersion is large and mobility is low.
In this paper we therefore report results using three diﬀerent definitions of
regional labour markets: Municipality, County and Local Labour Oﬃce Area
(LLOA).1
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Furthermore, we make an investigation of the shape of the wage curve.
Blanchflower and Oswald (1990, 1994) provide evidence in favour of a more
convex wage curve than the conventional log-linear specification. Results
for Norway based on aggregate time series data (Johansen, 1995, 1997) and
industry panel data (Johansen, 1996, 1999) suggest that the Norwegian ag-
gregate wage curve is highly nonlinear. The present paper makes an investi-
gation of the shape of the Norwegian regional wage curve.
One possible objection to the results in Dyrstad and Johansen (2000)
is biasedness because participants on LMP are not included. Raaum and
Wulfsberg (1998) report that higher participation rate on LMP significantly
reduces regional wages. Similar evidence for Sweden can be found in Edin et
al. (1994). Further, the number of participants are positively correlated with
open unemployment across regions. In this paper we therefore re-estimate
the regional wage equation including information on LMP.
The paper also highlights the role of regional manufacturing profitabil-
ity in shaping regional manufacturing wages. This issue is related to the
studies of insider forces in wage determination like Nickell and Wadhwani
(1990), Nickell and Kong (1992) and Nickell et al. (1994) who report signifi-
cant long-run eﬀects of firm or industry level profitability on firm or industry
level wages. The empirical evidence regarding insider eﬀects on Norwegian
wages is mixed. Holmlund and Zetterberg (1991) find small and statistically
insignificant eﬀects of industry prices and productivity on industry wages
while the long-run insider weight reported in Johansen (1996, 99) approxi-
mates 20%. Using panel data for Norwegian manufacturing firms, Wulfsberg
(1997a) reports a statistically significant insider weight of 5% while the re-
sults in Raaum and Wulfsberg (1998) imply a long-run insider weight above
30%. Finally, Dyrstad and Johansen (2000) report a long-run elasticity of
wages with respect to value added per worker slightly above 10% based on
regional manufacturing data.
Payroll taxes have been regionally diﬀerentiated (since 1975) in order to
stimulate regional employment in depressed areas. How such a policy works
depends among other things on the wage responses to a tax cut. If reduced
payroll taxes are transmitted into higher regional earnings, the main eﬀect
will be an income redistribution while the eﬀects on regional employment
and unemployment will be small. An important policy issue is therefore to
estimate how regional wage costs are aﬀected by changes in regional payroll
taxes, both in the short run and in the long run.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief
presentation of the empirical model. The main results are reported in Section
3 while concluding comments are given in Section 4.
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2 Data and empirical specification
The theoretical basis for the analysis is a standard firm level bargaining
model, see Nickell and Andrews (1983) and Hoel and Nymoen (1988). Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1994, Ch. 3) oﬀer a survey on theoretical models pre-
dicting a downward sloping wage curve. The starting point for the empirical
study is an equilibrium correction model which contains feedback eﬀects of
region specific variables, while any eﬀects of aggregate variables, common to
all municipalities, will be captured by a full set of time dummies.
The study uses a panel of annual time series data from 322 Norwegian
municipalities covering the time period 1970—92.2 The regional wage vari-
able, Wj, is manufacturing wage costs per worker, including payroll taxes.
Our measure of regional profitability, Pj , is manufacturing value added at
factor prices per worker. We include the regionally diﬀerentiated payroll
tax rate, TPj, and lagged levels of employment, Njt−1, to test for insider
(or membership) hysteresis eﬀects. Three alternative definitions of open re-
gional unemployment will be used: the municipality unemployment rate, Uj,
the county unemployment rate, Uc, and finally the unemployment rate in the
LLOA, Ul.
The benchmark regional wage equation to be estimated below is given by
∆wjt = −αwjt−1 + β1pjt−1 + β2uit−1 + β3tpjt−1 + β3njt−1
+γ1∆pjt + γ2∆uit + γ3∆tpjt + ηt + ηj + εjt, (1)
where lowercase letters denote natural logs and tp = ln (1 + TP ), subscript
i = j, c, l reflects alternative definitions of the regional unemployment rate, ηt
are the common time specific eﬀects, ηj are time invariant municipality spe-
cific eﬀects while εjt are the remaining error terms, assumed to be iid(0, σ2ε) .
To test for nonlinearity we follow Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) and
expand equation (1) with the cube of log regional unemployment. We have
information on LMP only at the county level, and only for the time period
1980—92. For this period we re-estimate the wage equation including total
county unemployment, TUc, and the ratio of open to total county unemploy-
ment, Uc/TUc, as separate variables.3
3 Empirical results
3.1 Results for the benchmark model
Since the dynamic wage equation (1) includes municipality specific eﬀects,
the within-groups estimators are biased even if the residuals are white noise.
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Furthermore, value added per worker and employment should be regarded
as endogenously determined and potentially correlated with the municipality
specific eﬀects. The same may be true for regional unemployment. In this
case we report results given alternative assumptions of the exogeneity status
of the unemployment variable.
To obtain consistent estimators we apply a system GMM estimator sug-
gested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). The
system GMM estimator uses equations in first-diﬀerences, from which the
municipality specific eﬀects are eliminated by the transformation. In these
equations endogenous variables lagged two or more periods are valid instru-
ments provided there is no serial correlation in the time-varying component
of the error terms. The diﬀerenced equations are combined with equations in
levels. In these equations the instruments must be orthogonal to the munici-
pality specific eﬀects. As shown in Blundell and Bond (1998), first-diﬀerences
of variables can be uncorrelated with the individual specific eﬀects even if
the levels are correlated with the eﬀects.
Table 1 report results where wjt−1, ∆pjt, pjt−1 and njt−1 are treated as
endogenous.4 The set of instruments are defined in note iii to the Table. It
should be noted that regional unemployment is assumed strictly exogenous
and also uncorrelated with the municipality specific eﬀects.
Equation I contains the municipality unemployment rate while equation
II contains county unemployment and equation III the unemployment rate in
the LLOA. The short-run impact eﬀect of regional unemployment is small for
all specifications and statistically insignificant in equation II and III. The es-
timated level eﬀect is significantly below zero in all equations and robust with
respect to specification.5 The estimate of lagged regional wages is significantly
below zero which means that the Phillips curve specification is rejected. Us-
ing the results in Table 1 we find that the estimated long-run unemployment
elasticity of pay ranges from —2.0% in equation III to —2.7% in equation II.6
These estimates are well below the estimates reported in Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994) and confirm the finding in Dyrstad and Johansen (2000) that
regional wage responses to regional labour market conditions are rather weak.
Interestingly, Nicolaisen and Tranæs (1996), using Danish data for individ-
uals linked to county unemployment, report an unemployment elasticity of
—2%. Furthermore, Holmlund and Skedinger (1990), estimating wage drift
equations on data from the Swedish wood industry, also obtain negative but
small eﬀects of regional unemployment. The long-run elasticity with respect
to county unemployment is —1.6%.
In order to discriminate between the three diﬀerent specifications we esti-
mated a general model which contains the three unemployment rates (in first
diﬀerences and lagged levels). The individual coeﬃcients of ∆uct, ∆ult, uct−1,
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ult−1 were all statistically insignificant while the individual coeﬃcients of∆ujt
and ujt−1 were both significantly below zero. A test of the joint null hypoth-
esis that the coeﬃcients of ∆uct, ∆ult, uct−1, ult−1 are all equal to zero yields
χ2 (4) = 5.79 with a p-value of 0.22. On the other hand, a test of the null
that the coeﬃcients of ∆ujt and ujt−1 are equal to zero yields χ2(2) = 15.59
which is highly significant.
Table 1 about here
The main finding so far is that the wage responses to regional labour mar-
ket tightness are weak, a conclusion that seems robust with respect to the
alternative definition of regional labour market regions. The small eﬀects of
regional unemployment may reflect a mix of a downward sloping wage curve
and a positive unemployment eﬀect due to compensating wage diﬀerentials,
cf. Harris and Todaro (1970).7 As noted by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994)
the Harris-Todaro concept of compensating diﬀerentials and a downward
sloping wage curve may well coexist. Because migration is costly, migrants’
choices are not likely to respond to transitory shocks to regional unemploy-
ment. It is the permanent or expected values of regional wages and regional
unemployment that might be positively correlated in a long-run equilibrium.
Since it seems likely that municipality fixed eﬀects will capture any eﬀects of
permanent unemployment diﬀerences, we made a comparison of the within
groups (WG) estimates with the plain OLS estimates. For all three unem-
ployment rates, the absolute value of the OLS estimates were larger than the
corresponding WG estimates.8 Although this experiment should not be inter-
preted as a formal test of the hypothesis of compensating wage diﬀerentials,
the results are not supportive to this hypothesis. However, the diﬀerences
between the OLS and WG estimates may reflect an eﬀect of left out variables
that are correlated with regional unemployment. One obvious candidate is
regional consumer prices.
Both the short-run impact eﬀect of value added per worker, and the long-
run level eﬀect are well determined in all equations. The long-run insider
weight approximates 23%. This estimate implies that the eﬀect of a hy-
pothetical change in value added per worker from the sample mean to its
maximum value would increase regional wages by 64%.
The estimated insider weight reported in Table 1 is higher than the corre-
sponding estimates in Dyrstad and Johansen (2000). On the other hand, the
new estimates are largely in accordance with results based on panel data for
Norwegian industries reported in Johansen (1996, 1999). A positive long-run
relation between regional wages and regional manufacturing profitability is
evidence against competitive forces as well as completely centralised wage
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setting. Our interpretation is that such permanent eﬀects reflect wage bar-
gaining at the firm level.
We find no evidence of an insider hysteresis eﬀect as lagged values of re-
gional manufacturing employment, njt−1, always enter with a positive sign,
and the estimates are statistically significant from zero. As an alterna-
tive to lagged employment levels we included current values of employment
changes, ∆njt, properly instrumented. The estimates of ∆njt were always
negatively signed and statistically insignificant from zero confirming the re-
sults in Dyrstad and Johansen (2000).
The short-run impact elasticity of regional payroll taxes vary from 0.8
to 0.9 while the long-run elasticity vary from 0.85 to 0.96. All estimates
are statistically significant from zero and never statistically diﬀerent from
unity. The estimated long-run eﬀects are largely in accordance with the
results reported in Dyrstad and Johansen (2000) and Wulfsberg (1997b).
Reduced regional payroll taxes are mainly transmitted into reduced wage
costs. Hence, the regionally diﬀerentiated payroll tax system seems to be an
eﬀective policy instrument, given that labour costs are important for labour
demand. In fact, preliminary results based on the same data set imply a
long run elasticity of municipality manufacturing employment with respect
to wages approximately equal to —1.
Table 1 reports several diagnostic test statistics. First, the Arellano and
Bond (1991) test of no second-order serial correlation in the diﬀerenced resid-
uals, AR2, is always below critical values. On the other hand, the AR1
statistic clearly indicate negative first-order serial correlation. Taken to-
gether these results imply that the levels of the error terms are white noise.
Sargan[232] is the Sargan (1958, 1988) test of over-identifying restrictions.
This is a joint test of the validity of all orthogonality restrictions. Sargan
diﬀ1[2] tests the validity of treating regional unemployment as exogenous and
uncorrelated with the municipality specific eﬀects while Sargan diﬀ2[84] tests
the validity of the orthogonality restriction for the levels equations.9 Finally,
two Hausman-type tests are reported. Hausman[8] tests the null that all
parameters are equal in the equations in levels and first diﬀerences while
Hausman[2] tests the null that the coeﬃcients of regional unemployment are
equal across these equations. The two Hausman tests enter with a p-value
slightly above 5% in equation I. In all other cases all tests are well below
their corresponding critical values.
Although all tests reported in Table 1 look comfortable we investigated
the sensitivity of the results with respect to diﬀerent estimators. First, we re-
estimated the wage equations in Table 1 using the GMM-diﬀerence estimator
proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Second, we excluded ∆uit and uit−1
from the set of instruments, taking endogeneity and potential correlation
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with municipality eﬀects into account. The main result of interest was that
the absolute value of the estimated unemployment eﬀects were smaller for
all alternative estimators as compared with their corresponding counterparts
reported in Table 1. This evidence suggest that the results in Table 1 do
not under-estimate the absolute value of the true regional unemployment
coeﬃcient.
3.2 Nonlinear unemployment eﬀects
The next issue will be to further investigate the shape of the wage regional
curve. In order to test for more complicated nonlinearity we follow Blanch-
flower and Oswald (1994) and expand the benchmark wage equation with
the cube of log unemployment. The estimated wage equation is then given
by
∆wjt = −αwjt−1 + β1pjt−1 + β20uit−1 + β21u3it−1 + β3tpjt−1 + β3njt−1
+γ1∆pjt + γ2∆uit + γ3∆tpjt + ηt + ηj + εjt, (2)
where we expect β21 to be positive.
The results reported in Table 2 show that the estimate of the cube of
log regional unemployment is positive for all alternatives and statistically
significant in equation I and II. The estimated coeﬃcients of u3it−1 are small, in
particular for municipality unemployment. Nevertheless, the results provide
strong evidence of a more convex regional wage curve than implied by the
usual log-linear specification.
Table 2 about here
Figure 1 graphs the long-run regional wage curves based on the results
in Table 2. The wage level is normalised to unity for regional unemployment
rates equal to 1%. The wage curve based on county unemployment is U-
shaped and minimises at an unemployment rate equal to 4.6%. The other two
are monotonically decreasing for unemployment rates within their respective
sample ranges.10
Figure 1 about here
We also estimated the wage equations in Table 2 using data for the sub-
sample 1981—1992 which is the sample period used in the next section. For
this sub-sample we still found a positive and significant estimate of the cubic
term using data for municipality unemployment. However, the cubic term
was highly insignificant for the other regional unemployment rates. This
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result may reflect the fact that there are no extremely low unemployment
rates at these levels of aggregation during the period 1981—1992 and that the
log-linear specification works well when unemployment is not too low.
3.3 Labour market programs
Finally, we investigate the eﬀects of labour market programs. Standard mod-
els of wage bargaining predict ambiguous wage eﬀects of expanding LMPs,
see Calmfors and Lang (1995) for a formal discussion. On the one side
workers may prefer LMPs to open unemployment. Expanding programs will
therefore reduce the expected welfare loss of being laid oﬀ. The partial ef-
fect is higher wages. On the other hand, LMPs may have positive eﬀects on
the re-employment prospect for participants through enhancement of skills,
motivation and labour force participation. In this case LMPs will increase
search eﬀectiveness of the not-employed workers which implies increased job
competition and therefore reduced wages.
The empirical specification is based on recent work by Rødseth and Ny-
moen (1999) and Raaum and Wulfsberg (1998) and reads
∆wjt = −αwjt−1 + β1pjt−1 + β2tpjt−1 + β3tuct−1 + β4 (u− tu)ct−1
+γ1∆pjt + γ2∆tpjt + γ3∆tuct + γ4∆ (u− tu)ct
+ηj + ηt + vjt, (3)
where tu is the log of total unemployment (the sum of openly unemployed
and program participants divided by the labour force) while u is the log of
the rate of open unemployment. This specification enable us to test two
specific hypotheses. The first one is that only total unemployment matters
which means that β4 = 0. In this case an expansion of LMP will not aﬀect
wages when the participants are recruited from open unemployment while
wage pressure is reduced if they are recruited from regular employment. The
second hypothesis is that only open unemployment matters which means that
β4 = β3 < 0. In this case an expansion of LMP will increase wages if the
participants are recruited from open unemployment while there is no wage
eﬀect if they are recruited from regular employment (programs are perfect
substitutes to regular employment). A positive value of β4 means that ex-
panding programs will reduce wages even if participants are recruited from
open unemployment. Finally, in the cases where β4 < β3, programs will in-
crease wages even if the participants are recruited from regular employment.
The same comments also apply for the short-run impact eﬀects.
We have data for LMP only at the county level and only for the period
1980—92. Equation (3) is therefore estimated including county unemploy-
ment for this period. Table 3 reports the results. We first note that all
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diagnostic test statistics look comfortable for all equations. In order to test
for parameter stability we first re-estimate equation II in Table 1 using data
for the sub-sample. The results in the first column of Table 3 reveal that the
level eﬀect of county unemployment is higher for this sub-sample period as
compared with the full sample estimates. The absolute value of the long-run
unemployment elasticity of pay increases from 2.7% to 3.6%. One possible
explanation is that reduced time period makes the cross-section variation
more important which may aﬀect the estimates. We therefore re-estimated
the equation using data for the period 1973—80. Based on data for this period
we obtained a long-run unemployment elasticity equal to 2%. These results
therefore indicate increasing regional wage flexibility over time, possibly be-
cause firm level bargaining have become more important during our sample
period, cf. Holden (1989) and Rødseth and Holden (1990) for institutional
evidence.
Column II reports results based on the unrestricted version of equation
(3). The short-run impact eﬀect of total unemployment is negatively signed
but statistically insignificant while the long-run level eﬀect is significantly
below zero. The absolute value of the long-run elasticity is slightly higher
than the corresponding estimate for open unemployment reported in column
I. The estimated eﬀects of ∆ (u− tu)ct and (u− tu)ct−1 are both positively
signed. An increase in the program ratio (reduced value of u − tu) will
therefore reduce wage pressure both in the short run and in the long run
even if the program participants are recruited from open unemployment.
Table 3 about here
To illustrate the eﬀects of higher unemployment and expanding programs
we consider the following experiments. Assume that total unemployment is
initially equal to 5%, that the rate of open unemployment is 4% while 1%
of the labour force is allocated to labour market programs. In case one we
increase the rate of open unemployment by 1 percentage point holding the
participation rate constant. Given the estimates in Table 3 this will induce
a long-run wage moderation of 0.42%. In case two we increase the partic-
ipation rate by 1 percentage point holding the rate of open unemployment
constant. In this case the long-run wage moderation is 2.11%. In case three,
total unemployment is constant while the participation rate is increased by
1 percentage point. That is, 1% of the labour force is allocated from open
unemployment to LMP. Such a policy would reduce wages by 2.18% in the
long run.
One possible explanation of the strong numerical eﬀects of LMP may
be that programs have been targeted towards the long-term unemployed,
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and that labour market training programs have particularly favourable eﬀect
on search eﬀectiveness for this group. However, it should be noted that the
estimates of∆ (u− tu)ct and (u− tu)ct−1 are not statistically significant from
zero, neither partially nor jointly, and we can not statistically reject the null
hypothesis that only total unemployment matters. The imprecise estimates
of ∆ (u− tu)ct and (u− tu)ct−1 partly reflects an identification problem since
LMPs have been targeted towards regions with high unemployment, and the
correlation coeﬃcient between tuct and (u− tu)ct is —0.5.
Column III reports results for a restricted version of the equation which
excludes ∆tuct, ∆ (u− tu)ct and (u− tu)ct. These restrictions are clearly not
rejected by data as the test yields χ2 (3) = 2.83 with a p-value of 0.50. The
estimated elasticity of total unemployment is almost entirely unaﬀected by
imposing these restrictions. To conclude, we therefore find some evidence in
favour of a wage dampening eﬀect of LMP but these are mainly captured by
total unemployment.
How do these results compare to those obtained by others? In a recent
time series study of wage formation in the Nordic countries, Rødseth and
Nymoen (1999) report negatively signed and statistically significant long-
run eﬀects of total unemployment for all the Nordic countries (i.e. Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden). The estimates of ∆ (u− tu) and (u− tu)
are negatively signed but statistically insignificant from zero with one ex-
ception: The short-run impact eﬀect is positive and significant for Norway
which implies a short-run wage dampening eﬀect of expanding LMP. How-
ever, their results suggest that it is the rate of open unemployment that is
the fundamental long-run labour-market tightness variable in all countries as
the hypothesis that β4 = β3 is not rejected. Similar results can be found in
Holden and Nymoen (1998) based on the same data set.
Raaum and Wulfsberg (1998) report results for diﬀerent specifications
using firm level panel data linked to labour market variables at the county
level. Their Model B contains tu and u − tu in first diﬀerences and lagged
levels as in our specification. This specification includes average wages at the
county level but no aggregate variables. Both the short-run impact eﬀect and
the level eﬀect of total unemployment are negatively signed and statistically
significant. The short-run impact eﬀect and level eﬀect of u− tu are positive
and highly significant. However, all estimates of local labour market variables
are strongly reduced when either aggregate unemployment or time dummies
are included. In these specifications no local labour market variables enter
significantly.
Forslund (1993) uses Swedish panel data for 12 unemployment insurance
funds and allows for diﬀerent eﬀects of labour market training programs and
relief work. The estimated wage eﬀect of manpower training is negatively
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signed, statistically significant and close to the estimated eﬀect of open un-
employment. On the other hand, the eﬀect of relief work is positive and
bordercase significant.11 Edin et al. (1994) oﬀer a study of the relationship
between regional labour market variables and wage pressure in Sweden us-
ing a large micro data set. Their findings suggest that manpower training
programmes reduce wages while the estimated eﬀect of relief work depends
upon the exact specification. However, their results never implies a signifi-
cant wage hike from relief work. Pannenberg and Schwarze (1998) use micro
data for East Germany 1992—94 linked to regional labour market indicators.
They provide evidence in favour of an inverse relation between wages and
the total regional unemployment rate while the composition between open
unemployment and program participants is of little importance.12
Finally, we test whether or not the eﬀect of labour market programs
depends upon the state of the regional labour market. Expanding labour
market programs may induce a wage hike in regions and time periods with
initially low levels of unemployment and wage moderation in regions and
periods with suﬃciently high unemployment. To test this hypothesis we re-
estimate equation I in Table 3 including open unemployment interacted with
(uc − tuc) , both in levels and first diﬀerences. The results reported in Table
4, column I, are in general supportive to the hypothesis. The estimates of
(u− tu)ct−1 and ∆ (u− tu)ct are both negatively signed but statistically in-
significant from zero. Both interaction terms are positive and bordercase sig-
nificant. In column II we report results for a restricted version which excludes
(u− tu)ct−1 , ∆tuc and ∆ (u− tu)ct . The estimated eﬀect of the remaining
variables are almost entirely unaﬀected by imposing these restrictions.
Table 4 about here
Turning to the other results reported in Table 3 and 4 we note that the
estimated eﬀects of value added per worker are slightly below their corre-
sponding full-sample estimates. The estimated long-run insider weight ap-
proximates 17% using data for the last sub-sample while the full-sample
estimate is 23%. Also, the short-run impact eﬀect of regional payroll taxes
is smaller for the sub-sample. The long-run elasticity is close to unity in
column I and III in Table 3 but somewhat smaller in column II — and in
Table 4 — which include the participation rate as a separate variable. These
diﬀerences may reflect a negative correlation between LMP and regional pay-
roll taxes.13 Excluding programmes may therefore bias the payroll tax eﬀect
upwards. Finally, the insider hysteresis term is positive and still statistically
significant from zero.
12
4 Concluding comments
The main issue in this paper has been to analyse empirically how Norwegian
regional wages are eﬀected by regional specific shocks to unemployment. A
high degree of regional wage responsiveness to regional unemployment im-
plies strong equilibrating mechanisms which dampen unfavourable real eﬀects
of asymmetric shocks. Vigorous wage responsiveness leads to low unemploy-
ment equilibria while regional wage stickiness implies regional unemployment
persistence.
The results suggest that regional wage responses to open regional un-
employment are small. The full sample estimates based on a system GMM
estimator imply a long-run unemployment elasticity of pay approximately
equal to -2%. The estimated unemployment eﬀect is robust to the definition
of regional labour market areas. Although the regional wage responses to un-
employment seem to increase over time, we conclude that the equilibrating
mechanism working through the regional wage formation process is weak.
The low degree of regional wage responses to open unemployment is an ar-
gument in favour of an active regional policy. Interestingly, reduced regional
payroll taxes will mainly reduce regional wage costs and consequently stim-
ulate regional employment. Furthermore, we find a numerically important
wage dampening eﬀect of labour market programs. However, the estimated
eﬀects of labour market programs are not statistically significant and we can
not reject the null hypothesis that only total unemployment matters.
Recent studies of the Swedish wage formation process find diﬀerent wage
eﬀects of manpower training programs and relief work. An interesting issue
for further research would be to allow for diﬀerent eﬀects of the diﬀerent
types of labour market programs used in Norway.
Finally, we find that regional manufacturing profitability is important in
shaping regional manufacturing wages while there is no evidence of an insider
(or membership) hysteresis eﬀect.
13
A Data and sources
Wj = wage costs per worker including payroll taxes, municipality j, man-
ufacturing. Source: Statistics Norway (SN).
Pj = value added per worker at factor prices, municipality j, manufactur-
ing. Source: SN.
Nj = manufacturing employment, municipality j. Source: SN.
TPj = payroll tax rate municipality j. Source: Norwegian Tax Inspectorate.
Uj = rate of open unemployment, municipality j. Defined as number of
registered unemployed divided by labour force. Source: SN.
Uc = rate of open unemployment county c. Same definition as for Uj.
Source: SN.
Ul = rate of open unemployment LLOA l. Same definition as for Uj.
Source: SN.
Rc = participation rate county c. Number of program participants relative
to labour force. Source: Directorate of Labour.
TUc = total unemployment rate county c. Defined as Uc +Rc.
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NOTES
1 There are (in 1999) 435 municipalities, 19 counties and 106 LLOAs.
2 The number of municipalities has changed during our sample period.
Due to admistritative changes some municipalities has been merged in
order to have cross-sections covering the same geographical area during
the whole period. More important, municipalities with less than 20
manufacturing workers have been excluded from the data set.
3 See appendix A for definitions and sources. Dyrstad and Johansen
(2000) provide descriptive statistics for most variables for the period
1970—88 while details on labour market programs can be found in
Raaum and Wulfsberg (1998).
4 All results are computed using DPD98 for GAUSS, see Arellano and
Bond (1998). We report the robust one-step estimates since simulations
suggest that the asymptotically more eﬃcient two-step estimator gives
downward biased estimates of the standard errors in finite samples.
5 It should be noted that the estimated standard errors of the unemploy-
ment eﬀects in equation II and III may be biased downwards due to
common group eﬀects, cf. Moulton (1990).
6 The standard errors of the long-run coeﬃcients are calculated using the
procedure suggested by Bårdsen (1989).
7 Brunstad and Dyrstad (1997) find evidence of compensating diﬀeren-
tials on Norwegian data while the results in Johansen et al. (1999)
are not supportive to the hypothesis. Partridge and Rickman (1997)
provide recent evidence for the US.
8 Results referred in the text but not reported are available from the
author upon request.
9 The Sargan diﬀ1 test is computed by re-estimating the model in ques-
tion excluding ∆uit and uit−1 from the set of instruments. To compute
the Sargan diﬀ2 test the models are re-estimated in first diﬀerences.
10 The sample maximum for municipality unemployment is 10.3%, for
county 4.9%, and 6.7% for LLOA.
11 It should be noted that the labour market variables used by Forslund
are all aggregate variables.
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12 The wage curves estimated by Pannenberg and Schwarze include the
log of the ”job searcher rate” — which broadly corresponds to the log
of total unemployment — and the ”accomodation rate”.
13 The correlation coeﬃcient between tpjt and (u− tu)ct is 0.47.
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Table 1: Regional Wage Equations — GMM-System Estimates
Dependent variable is ∆wjt Sample period: 1973—92 (322 municipalities)
I II III
w∗jt−1 -0.502 (0.034) -0.513 (0.034) -0.511 (0.034)
p∗jt−1 0.113 (0.023) 0.119 (0.025) 0.116 (0.025)
tpjt−1 0.482 (0.138) 0.439 (0.141) 0.433 (0.142)
ujt−1 -0.011 (0.002) - -
uct−1 - -0.014 (0.005) -
ult−1 - - -0.010 (0.004)
∆p∗jt 0.147 (0.033) 0.155 (0.036) 0.150 (0.036)
∆tpjt 0.900 (0.270) 0.779 (0.261) 0.843 (0.267)
∆ujt -0.009 (0.003) - -
∆uct - 0.000 (0.007) -
∆ult - - -0.005 (0.005)
n∗jt−1 0.040 (0.007) 0.044 (0.008) 0.045 (0.007)
Long run estimates
pj 0.225 (0.041) 0.232 (0.044) 0.227 (0.044)
tpj 0.960 (0.268) 0.854 (0.268) 0.847 (0.271)
uj -0.022 (0.005) - -
uc - -0.027 (0.010) -
ul - - -0.020 (0.007)
Diagnosticsbσ 0.081 0.083 0.084
Joint significance[8] 269.8, p=0.00 276.82, p=0.00 293.79, p=0.00
Sargan [232] 243.8, p=0.28 247.0, p=0.24 247.5, p=0.23
Sargan diﬀ1[2] 1.21, p=0.55 3.44, p=0.18 3.20, p=0.20
Sargan diﬀ2[84] 67.4, p=0.90 75.2, p=0.74 70.4, p=0.85
Hausman[8] 15.37, p=0.052 14.59, p=0.068 13.38, p=0.100
Hausman[2] 5.77, p=0.056 3.83, p=0.147 2.77, p=0.250
AR1 -10.6, p=0.00 -10.50, p=0.00 -10.61, p=0.00
AR2 -0.36, p=0.62 -0.41, p=0.68 -0.38, p=0.71
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Notes:
i One-step robust standard errors reported in parentheses.
ii Time dummies are included in all equations.
iii Starred variables are instrumented. Additional instruments are wjt−2,
wjt−3, pjt−2, pjt−3, uit−2, uit−3, njt−2, njt−3 in the diﬀerenced equation
and ∆wjt−1,∆pjt−1, ∆uit−1,∆njt−1 in the levels equations.
iv bσ is estimated equation standard error (levels).
v Joint significance is a Wald χ2 test testing the joint significance of all
variables included (not time dummies).
vi Sargan is the Sargan (1958) (joint) test of instrumental validity. Sargan
diﬀ1 tests the validity of treating regional unemployment exogenous.
Sargan diﬀ2 tests the validity of the orthogonality restriction for the
levels equations.
vii Hausman[8] is a Hausman type test, testing the null that all parameters
are equal in the levels and first diﬀerenced equations. Hausman[2] tests
the null that the unemployment eﬀects are equal.
viii ARk is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for the presence of k-th order
serial correlation in the first-diﬀerenced residuals. Asymptotic normal
under the null.
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Table 2: Testing Nonlinear Unemployment Eﬀects — GMM-System
Estimates
Dependent variable is ∆wjt Sample period: 1973—92 (322 municipalities)
I II III
w∗jt−1 -0.505 (0.034) -0.514 (0.034) -0.512 (0.034)
p∗jt−1 0.116 (0.024) 0.120 (0.025) 0.116 (0.025)
tpjt−1 0.487 (0.137) 0.416 (0.143) 0.426 (0.144)
ujt−1 -0.014 (0.003) - -
u3jt−1/100 0.019 (0.007) - -
uct−1 - -0.019 (0.006) -
u3ct−1/100 - 0.271 (0.109) -
ult−1 - - -0.012 (0.005)
u3lt−1/100 - - 0.061 (0.068)
∆p∗jt 0.151 (0.034) 0.156 (0.036) 0.151 (0.036)
∆tpjt 0.883 (0.270) 0.792 (0.262) 0.846 (0.267)
∆ujt -0.007 (0.003) - -
∆uct - 0.001 (0.007) -
∆ult - - -0.005 (0.005)
n∗jt−1 0.038 (0.007) 0.045 (0.008) 0.045 (0.007)
Long run estimates
pj 0.230 (0.041) 0.233 (0.044) 0.227 (0.044)
tpj 0.964 (0.266) 0.810 (0.269) 0.833 (0.274)
uj -0.029 (0.006) - -
u3j/100 0.038 (0.015) - -
uc - -0.037 (0.012) -
u3c/100 - 0.528 (0.218) -
uc - - -0.023 (0.009)
u3c/100 - - 0.120 (0.133)bσ 0.081 0.084 0.084
Joint significance[9] 290.8, p=0.00 288.8, p=0.00 278.2, p=0.00
Sargan[232] 243.3, p=0.29 248.7, p=0.22 247.0, p=0.24
AR1 -10.6, p=0.00 -10.50, p=0.00 -10.61, p=0.00
AR2 -0.35, p=0.73 -0.40, p=0.69 -0.37, p=0.71
Notes: See notes to Table 1
23
Table 3: Eﬀects of Labour Market Programmes — GMM-System Estimates
Dependent variable is ∆wjt Sample period: 1981—92 (322 municipalities)
I II III
w∗jt−1 -0.485 (0.041) -0.488 (0.041) -0.484 (0.041)
p∗jt−1 0.080 (0.030) 0.082 (0.030) 0.081 (0.030)
tpjt−1 0.480 (0.190) 0.333 (0.216) 0.456 (0.180)
uct−1 -0.017 (0.007) - -
tuct−1 - -0.020 (0.008) -0.020 (0.007)
(u− tu)ct−1 - 0.037 (0.034) -
∆p∗jt 0.093 (0.041) 0.095 (0.042) 0.094 (0.041)
∆tpjt 0.536 (0.318) 0.428 (0.336) 0.522 (0.321)
∆uct 0.008 (0.012) - -
∆tuct - -0.003 (0.015) -
∆ (u− tu)ct - 0.057 (0.039) -
n∗jt−1 0.043 (0.011) 0.046 (0.011) 0.041 (0.011)
LR estimates
pj 0.167 (0.057) 0.168 (0.056) 0.168 (0.057)
tpj 0.989 (0.386) 0.682 (0.434) 0.944 (0.366)
uc -0.036 (0.015) - -
tuc - -0.040 (0.017) -0.041 (0.015)
uc − tuc - 0.076 (0.070) -
Diagnosticsbσ 0.083 0.084 0.083
Joint sign 157[8], p=0.00 173[10], p=0.00 144.9[7], p=0.00
Restr - - 2.38[3], p=0.50
Sargan 136[124], p=0.28 130[124], p=0.32 136[127], p=0.27
AR1 -9.47, p=0.00 -9.47, p=0.00 -9.47, p=0.00
AR2 -0.25, p=0.80 -0.26, p=0.80 -0.28, p=0.78
Notes: Restr is a Wald χ2 test, testing the validity of the three restriction
imposed to Equation III. See also notes to Table 1.
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Table 4: Eﬀects of Labour Market Programmes — GMM-System Estimates
Interaction Eﬀects
Dependent variable is ∆wjt Sample period: 1981—92 (322 municipalities)
I II
w∗jt−1 -0.487 (0.041) -0.486 (0.041)
p∗jt−1 0.081 (0.029) 0.081 (0.029)
tpjt−1 0.304 (0.214) 0.291 (0.196)
tuct−1 -0.016 (0.008) -0.016 (0.007)
(u− tu)ct−1 -0.009 (0.039) -
Uct−1 × (u− tu)ct−1 0.013 (0.008) 0.012 (0.007)
∆p∗jt 0.093 (0.041) 0.093 (0.040)
∆tpjt 0.398 (0.342) 0.388 (0.335)
∆tuct 0.004 (0.011) -
∆ (u− tu)ct -0.009 (0.042) -
∆ [Uct × (u− tu)ct] 0.020 (0.009) 0.020 (0.009)
n∗jt−1 0.046 (0.011) 0.046 (0.011)
LR estimates
pj 0.166 (0.056) 0.167 (0.055)
tpj 0.626 (0.431) 0.598 (0.398)
tuc -0.032 (0.017) -0.033 (0.015)
uc − tuc -0.018 (0.080) -
Uc × (uc − tuc) 0.027 (0.017) 0.025 (0.014)
Diagnosticsbσ 0.084 0.084
Joint sign 175[12], p=0.00 160[9], p=0.00
Restr - 0.119[3] , p=0.99
Sargan 125[124], p=0.46 126[127], p=0.52
AR1 -9.50, p=0.00 -9.49, p=0.00
AR2 -0.21, p=0.84 -0.21, p=0.83
Notes: Restr is a Wald χ2 test, testing the validity of the three restriction
imposed to Equation III. See also notes to Table 1.
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Figure 1: Nonlinear Regional Wage Curves
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